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COMMENTS
PERSONAL LIABILITY IMPLICATIONS
OF THE DUTY TO WARN ARE HARD PILLS
TO SWALLOW: FROM TARASOFF TO
HUTCHINSON v. PATEL AND BEYOND
I. INTRODUCTION
Two decades have passed since the landmark case of Tarasoff v. Re-
gents of University of California,' and much ambiguity remains in the law
regarding therapist disclosure. Most courts and legislatures in the United
States have accepted the California Supreme Court's decision in Tarasoff
as a "foundation for establishing duties of reasonable care upon psycho-
therapists to . . .protect potential victims [from] their [dangerous] pa-
tients."2 Unfortunately, statutes and case law have added to, rather than
reduced, the concerns and uncertainties in this area of the law.'
In one of the most recent Tarasoff based decisions, Hutchinson v.
Patel,4 the Louisiana Supreme Court has effectively broadened third
party tort recovery beyond amounts which patients can receive, exposing
therapists to personal, not just professional, liability.' This decision alters
the Tarasoff analysis by subdividing the liability for the duty to protect
1. 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974)("Tarasoff I"), modified, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal.
1976)("Tarasoff If"). See discussion of both cases infra notes 10-43 and accompanying text.
2. Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 98 (1994)(discussing the
deeper implications of the Tarasoff decision and concluding that the decision suggests an
organized approach to tort remedies).
3. A commentator observed that "[olne reason for disenchantment with the judicial
approach is the confusing, divergent trends, which collectively do not provide helpful gui-
dance for the psychiatrist wishing to practice ethically and legally." Alan R. Felthous,
M.D., The Ever Confusing Jurisprudence of Psychotherapist's Duty to Protect, 17 J. PSYCHI-
ATRY & L. 575, 576 (1989).
4. 637 So. 2d 415 (La. 1994).
5. Cf. Penny Dowd Liuzza, Hutchinson v. Patel, Louisiana Supreme Court's First Re-
sponse to Tarasoff Duty to Warn: Broadens Recovery But Narrows Liability, 40 Loy. L.
REV. 1011, 1027 (1995)(concluding that the Louisiana Supreme Court holding broadens
third party recovery and "potentially narrow[s] therapist's scope of liability ... by restrict-
ing ... claim[s]"). The decision does narrow the scope of malpractice liability, but exposes
the therapist to a more unsettling personal liability.
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into both an independent duty to predict, that is subject to malpractice
liability,6 and an independent duty to warn, which is not subject to mal-
practice liability.7
Excluding Tarasoff claims from coverage under medical malpractice
acts will effectively deny therapists any insurance coverage whatsoever.8
Applying the holding in Hutchinson to future cases ultimately could re-
sult in driving therapists from this area of practice or forcing them to
increase their fees in order to cover the risk of personal liability. While
malpractice insurance rates may not increase, medical mental health serv-
ices may become more expensive. The Louisiana Supreme Court deci-
sion, based on ineffective legislation, will also diminish public safety by
discouraging therapists from treating potentially dangerous, mentally ill
patients.9
Although Tarasoff, a California case, is only persuasive authority in
Louisiana and other jurisdictions outside California, its reasoning and the
reasoning of other courts and legislatures dealing with the malpractice
issue are more convincing than Louisiana's stance.
This Comment criticizes the decisions and statutes holding therapists
personally liable for breaches of the duty to protect. Part II discusses the
evolution of the Tarasoff doctrine by looking at both case law and statu-
tory developments of the general duty to protect. Part III focuses on
cases dealing with malpractice liability implications, and analyzes both
sides of the issue. Part IV discusses another perspective of malpractice
categorization; it indicates the need for consistency in the law, and sug-
gests improvements in current statutes. This Comment concludes that
current laws must be changed. Current malpractice statutes and duty to
protect statutes need to reflect that the duty to protect consists of two
inextricably woven subparts: the duty to predict dangerousness and the
duty to protect the victim. A breach of the duty to protect third parties
occurs in the context of provision of professional services, and thus, it
6. 637 So. 2d at 424.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 422-23 (stating the defendant's compelling argument).
9. For a similar argument made in the context of the duty itself, see Alan A: Stone,
The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358,
373 (1976) (stating that although therapists do have a moral duty when third parties are
endangered by their patients, "the duty ... will reduce rather than increase public safety
because it will diminish the ability and motivation of therapists to treat effectively mentally
disturbed and potentially dangerous people"). The same result is likely to occur by making
the duty to warn a personal liability trap for therapists.
Personal Liability and the Duty to Warn
should constitute malpractice. Therapists should not be held personally
liable for what should be considered to be their professional negligence.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE THERAPISTS' DUTY TO PROTECT THIRD
PARTIES FROM THEIR DANGEROUS. PATIENTS
A. The Development of A Duty to Warn Third Parties:
The Tarasoff Cases
Tarasoff was the first case to find that therapists have a duty to warn
third parties of possible harm by their patients.1" In its first hearing of
the case, the California Supreme Court held that the victim's parents had
a cause of action against an outpatient's therapist for breach of the duty
to warn after the violent patient murdered their daughter Tatiana.11 Spe-
cifically, the court found that a therapist has a duty to warn when, "in the
exercise of his professional skill and knowledge, [the therapist] deter-
mines, or should determine,- that a warning is essential to avert danger
arising from the medical or psychological condition of his patient."' 2.
Prosenjit Poddar murdered Tatiana Tarasoff in 1969, just two months
after confiding this intention to a University of California psychologist. 3
The therapist notified the university's campus police at the time of the
threat, and based on his request, they apprehended Poddar.' 4 The cam-
pus police then released Poddar after deciding that he was rational and
warning him to stay away from Tatiana.' 5 Neither Tatiana nor her family
were notified of the threats on her life,' 6 and the therapist's supervisor
ordered "that no further action be taken to deter Poddar.' 17
In an unusual grant of rehearing, the California Supreme Court va-
cated its prior Tarasoff decision, holding instead that "[w]hen a therapist
determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should deter-
10. See Dianne S. Salter, Note, The Duty to Warn Third Parties: A Retrospective on
Tarasoff, 18 RuTGERS L.J. 145, 146 (1986) (examining the effects of the Tarasoff duty to
warn on psychotherapists' ability to conform their practices to the "nebulous" require-
ments of the law).
11. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 565 (Cal. 1974)("Tarasoff I").
12. Id. at 555.
13. Id. at 554. The therapist felt that Poddar should be committed to an institution and
notified the police of this fact by letter and by telephone. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 1976) ("Tarasoff II").
14. Tarasoff 1, 529 P.2d at 554.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 555. In fact, Poddar had moved in with Tatiana's brother just prior to the
murder. Tarasoff 11, 551 P.2d at 341.
17. Tarasoff I, 529 P.2d at 554-55.
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mine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he
incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim
against such danger." 18 The court went on to state that the duty could be
discharged in a number of ways, depending on the circumstances, includ-
ing "warn[ing] the intended victim or others likely to appraise the victim
of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are
reasonably necessary under the circumstances.' 19
1. Sources for the Duty
a. Common Law
The Tarasoff II court created an exception to the general rule under the
common law, which states that a person does not have an affirmative duty
to act to protect others even if action by a particular person is necessary
to prevent harm.20 Liability for nonfeasance has developed as a remedy
when a prior special relationship is shown to exist between two parties. 21
There is a duty to control the actions of "a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another [if] . . . a special relation exists
between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the
actor to control the third person's conduct. '22 The special relationship
exception to the general rule requires that the actor be able to, or have
18. Tarasoff H, 551 P.2d at 340 (replacing the Tarasoff I "duty to warn" with the much
broader "duty to protect").
19. Id. The alteration of the Tarasoff I holding has created confusion among therapists
who follow the rule of Tarasoff I which imposed only a duty to warn, not the broader duty
to protect. Vikram S. Mangalmurti, Psychotherapists' Fear of Tarasoff: All In the Mind?, 22
J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 379, 395 (1994). Although the duty to protect "could involve warning
the victim, such a response is not necessarily the only one available[, a] nuance often
missed by the critics of the California court's ruling." Id. at 381. Another commentator
pointed out that "the ... reasonableness standard presents a trier of fact with the post facto
guesswork of determining whether a duty existed to warn or take precautions." Michael R.
Geske, Note, Statutes Limiting Mental Health Professionals' Liability for the Violent Acts of
Their Patients, 64 IND. L.J. 391, 396 (1988). Courts in jurisdictions other than California
also have witnessed this confusion.' See, e.g., Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp.
185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980) (stating that precautions other than a warning may be required
under different circumstances).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
21. Id. § 314 cmt. c (1965). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 359 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that new duties emerge with
changes in society and courts will find a new duty when "reasonable men would recognize
it and agree that it exists").
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). For further discussion of the
duties imposed through special relationships see KEETON ET AL., supra note 21, at 356-59;
John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About
the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L.
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the right to, control the third person's conduct.23
The court in Tarasoff II found that a special relation existed between
the therapist and Poddar based on the patient-therapist relationship,24
and that "[s]uch a relationship may support affirmative duties for the
benefit of third persons."' 25 The court decided that the situation before it
was analogous to the situation in which a medical doctor diagnoses a pa-
tient with a communicable disease.26 In those cases, courts have held that
the doctor has a duty to warn any third parties who might be harmed
through their exposure to the disease.27
In order for the duty to warn to arise, the harm must be foreseeable,
and a special relationship must exist.28 The court will declare a duty
only upon the 'balancing of a number of considerations' ... [in-
cluding,] 'foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suf-
fered,2 9 the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to
the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing
REV. 867, 870 (suggesting that the therapists should have a duty to act reasonably under
the circumstances in duty to protect cases).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 316-19 (1965) (listing examples of spe-
cial relationships). Section 319 relates to the control of dangerous third persons. All of the
illustrations given describe patients in hospitals. There are no illustrations dealing with
outpatients who are typical in a psychiatric practice. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 319 (1965).
24. Tarasoff l, 551 P.2d at 343.
25. The court's finding that a special relationship existed in this case was criticized
because of the lack of control a therapist typically has over a patient in outpatient settings.
Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999, 1009 (D. Md. 1982) (stating that if there is not
the element of control over a patient, then there is no basis for a special relation exception
to the tort law rule that bars a duty to act). See also Stone, supra note 9, at 366 (stating that
"the therapist seeing a patient in a clinic or office has no control over the patient").
26. Tarasoff I, 551 P.2d at 344.
27. See, e.g., Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663 (Minn. 1919)(holding a medical doctor
liable for failing to warn a patient's parents of the contagious character of scarlet fever);
Davis v. Redman, 227 S.W. 612, 613 (Ark. 1921)(holding a doctor liable for not warning
the family of a patient that typhoid fever is contagious); Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d
865, 866 (Tenn. 1993)(recognizing cause of action for the wife of a patient who had Rocky
Mountain spotted fever because the doctor had a duty to warn her of the risk of exposure).
But see Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 450-51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)(stating that
the analogy between a therapist's duty to warn a third party of danger and a doctor having
to warn of communicable diseases is inappropriate because the latter diagnosis can be veri-
fied and is therefore much more accurate than a diagnosis predicting dangerousness).
28. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 342-43.
29. Referring to special relationships discussed supra notes 21-27 and accompanying
text.
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a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach,3" and
the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance 31 for the risk
involved.'32
The court identified foreseeability of harm as the most important factor
in imposing the duty to warn.33 The court acknowledged the fact that
therapists have difficulty in foreseeing dangerousness in their-patients.
34
One hundred percent accuracy in prediction is an unreasonable expecta-
tion; thus, the court determined that "the therapist need only exercise
'that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed
and exercised by members of [that professional specialty] under similar
circumstances.' 35 The court recognized that in this case, the harm was
foreseeable because of the therapist's predictions. 3
6
b. Public Policy
Although the patient in Tarasoff II had an acknowledged privacy inter-
est in his communications to his therapist, 37 the court found that the pub-
lic safety interest was more important.38 The court viewed the need for
30. These last three factors are a part of the public policy reasons for imposing the
duty. See discussion infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
31. See discussion on malpractice, including the insurance factor, infra Part III.C.
32. Tarasoff 11, 551 P.2d at 342.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 345.
35. Id. (stating, in addition, that "best judgment" is sufficient). Justice Mosk dis-
sented, objecting to the use of professional standards in predicting violence, stating that
there are no professional standards and that the majority's position removes us from "the
world of reality into the wonderland of clairvoyance." Id. at 354 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
36. Id. Even though Poddar did not specifically identify the victim, the court pointed
out that "a moment's reflection will reveal the ... identity;" thus, the court imposed no
strict rule regarding identity. Id. at 345 n.1 1. The court admonished therapists to disclose
identity information only if it "is necessary to avert danger to others, and [to] ... do so
discretely" in order to maximize patient privacy. Id. at 347.
37. Id. at 346.
38. Id. at 347. Referring to doctor/patient confidentiality, the court stated that "[tIhe
protective privilege ends where the public peril begins." Id. The United States Supreme
Court recently created a federal "psychotherapist privilege" that protects, from compelled
disclosure, confidential communications made in the course of psychotherapy between li-
censed psychiatrists, psychologists and social workers, and their patients. Jaffee v. Red-
mond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (1996). The Court also indicated that it would define the new
federal privilege on a case-by-case basis; however, the Court was careful to point out that it
"do[es] not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for exam-
ple, if a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a
disclosure by the therapist." Id. at 1932 n.19. Missouri courts have also favored the public
policy position, imposing a duty to warn and weighing factors similar to those in Tarasoff H
when determining whether there is a duty. Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Mo. Ct.
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societal protection as essential in the modem world;39 the risk of unneces-
sary warnings was "a reasonable price to pay for the lives of possible
victims that may be saved."4 Therefore, the court concluded that "[t]he
protective privilege ends where the public peril begins."41
2. Discharging the Duty
A therapist is under a duty of reasonable care both in determining dan-
gerousness and in protecting potential victims from that danger.42 In car-
rying out the duty to protect, the therapist's range of options includes
warning the victim or someone close to the victim, contacting the police,
or "tak[ing] whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the cir-
cumstances., 43 This ambiguous statement of "whatever steps are reason-
ably necessary,"" among other ambiguities, has led to court decisions
and statutes that narrow the options within the Tarasoff doctrine. 5
B. Refining the Tarasoff Doctrine Through Case Law
and Statutes
Most jurisdictions have adopted the Tarasoff II duty in one form or
another.46 Confusion regarding the exact requirements of this duty and
App. 1995) (finding that the public policy of Missouri favors imposing a duty to warn on
psychologists). Discussing Tarasoff II, one commentator argued that protecting the vic-
tim's constitutional right to life, liberty, and property was the court's rationale and that it
outweighed the doctor/patient privilege. Jonathan Baumoel, The Beginning of the End for
the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 797, 818 (1992).
39. Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 347. Specifically, the court stated that "[in this risk-in-
fested society we can hardly tolerate the further exposure to danger that would result from
a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal." Id.
40. Id. at 346.
41. Id. at 347. The Fourth Circuit has pointed out that "[t]he duty to warn is an ex-
pression of humanitarianism and the spirit of the Good Samaritan." Currie v. United
States, 836 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1987). One commentator has pointed out that "the court
merely codified what had been required for some time by the ethical standards of the
therapeutic profession itself." Mangalmurti, supra note 19, at 404.
42. Tarasoff I, 551 P.2d at 345. The duty is that "once a therapist does in fact deter-
mine, or under applicable professional standards reasonably should have determined, that
a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reason-
able care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger." Id.; see also Geske, supra note
19, at 392-94 (discussing the duty).
43. Tarasoff I1, 551 P.2d at 340.
44. Leslie B. Small, Psychotherapists' Duty to Warn: Ten Years After Tarasoff, 15
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 271, 291 (1985) (examining Tarasoff and its progeny and estab-
lishing that there is a need for statutory guidance).
45. See discussion infra Part I.B.
46. Lake, supra note 2. See also Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Statutory Approaches to
Limiting Psychiatrists' Liability for Their Patient's Violent Acts, 146 AM. J.. PSYCHIATRY
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which jurisdictions will enforce it continues to plague therapists. 47 Begin-
821, 822 (1989) (recognizing that most therapists believe that they have a duty to protect,
and recommending reforms that would clarify that duty).
47. J. T. Melella et al., The Psychotherapist's Third-Party Liability for Sexual Assaults
Committed By His Patients, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 83, 99 (1987) (a discussion on treatment
of sex offenders and therapists' legal liability). See also Salter, supra note 10, at 150-51
(pointing out that Tarasoff II and McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1979) (a case with similar facts and holding to Tarasoff II) "established that psycho-
therapists owe a duty to third parties in [those] jurisdictions, [but that] the scope of that
duty is unclear"). Several states have adopted, in some form and with varied standards, the
duty to warn in the context of psychotherapy: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-517.02 (West
1993) (explicit threat of immediate serious harm or death to a clearly identified or identifi-
able victim); CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.92 (West 1996) (serious threat of physical violence
against a reasonably identifiable victim); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728,
738 (Cal. 1980) (duty to warn if "predictable threat of harm to a named or readily identifi-
able victim or group of victims who can be effectively warned of the danger."); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-21-117 (West 1987) (serious threat of immediate physical violence against
specific person(s)); Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1210 n.8 (Colo. 1989) (recognizing the
Colorado statute which outlines the duty to warn); Almonte v. New York Med. College,
851 F. Supp. 34, 40-41 (D. Conn. 1994) (duty to warn when specific threat is made against
specific group of victims); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5402 (1995) (explicit and imminent
threat to kill or seriously injure a clearly identified victim); Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064,
1073 (Del. 1988) (duty extends when there is an unreasonable danger to potential victims
or to classes of potential victims that are identifiable); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.2415 (West
Supp. 1996) (actual threat against an identifiable victim); Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296
S.E.2d 693, 695-96 (Ga. 1982) (recognizing duty to warn and duty to control hospital pa-
tient when patient is likely to cause harm to others); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1902, 6-1903
(1996)(explicit threat of immediate serious harm or death to a clearly identified or identifi-
able victim); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-2 (Michie 1996) (actual threat of physical vio-
lence or other means of harm against a reasonably identifiable victim); Boulanger v. Pol,
900 P.2d 823, 835 (Kan. 1995)(recognizing a duty to warn, but finding that it does not apply
when the victim already knew of the danger); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400 (Michie
1991) (actual threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifi-
able victim or actual threat of some specific violent act); Evans v. Morehead Clinic, 749
S.W.2d 696, 699 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988)(serious risk of violence against a reasonably foresee-
able victim, i.e., specifically identifiable or readily identifiable); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2800.2 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995)(threat of physical violence against a clearly identified
victim); Bardoni v. Kim, 390 N.W.2d 218,221 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (duty to warn arises if
patient poses serious danger of violence to readily identifiable victim); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 148.975(1)(e) (West 1989) (specific, serious threat of physical violence against a specific,
clearly identified or identifiable potential victim); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 311
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (specific risk of future harm to a readily identifiable victim); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-1102 (1995) (actual threat of physical violence by specific means against
a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-1, 206.30
(Supp. 1994) (serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim);
Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Neb. 1980) (duty to take precau-
tions, including warnings, to protect potential victims of a patient who poses an unreasona-
ble risk of harm to others); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329:31, 330-A:22 (1995) (serious
threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim or
serious threat of substantial damage to real property); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16.b
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ning with the case of Thompson v. County of Alameda,48 courts have at-
tempted to refine the Tarasoff doctrine. In Thompson, a juvenile
delinquent was released from county institutional custody and subse-
quently murdered a child. 49 The court held that "the duty to warn de-
pends upon and arises from the existence of a prior threat to a specific
identifiable victim."5 In this case, the threats made by the juvenile delin-
quent were generalized,5 and the court declined to create an affirmative
duty to warn such a "large amorphous public group of potential
targets."52 Other courts have followed Thompson's lead by requiring
specific threats against readily identifiable victims before a duty arises."
(West 1996) (threat of imminent, serious, physical violence against a readily identifiable
individual or against himself); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (N.J. Super. 1979)
(duty to "take whatever steps are reasonably necessary" when a patient manifests identifi-
able dangerousness toward an intended or potential victim(s)); Littleton v. Good Samari-
tan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d 449, 455 (Ohio 1988) (duty to protect a person
through reasonable precautions from the violent propensities of the psychiatrist's patient
within the inpatient setting); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-102 (1992) (actual threat of physi-
cal violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim); Peck v. Counsel-
ing Serv., 499 A.2d 422, 425-26 (Vt. 1985) (duty to warn when patient poses serious risk of
danger against a readily identifiable victim); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.120(2) (West
1992) (actual threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim); Peterson
v. State, 671 P.2d 230, 237 (Wash. 1983)(en banc) (duty to protect from danger foreseeable
victims); Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 165 (Wis. 1988) (duty to warn applies
when it is "foreseeable that an act or omission to act may cause harm to someone," and
duty is not limited to a readily identifiable victim). Other jurisdictions have not yet im-
posed a duty to warn, but there are indications that they would do so under the proper
circumstances: Morton v. Prescott, 564 So.2d 913, 916 (Ala. 1990) (duty to warn would
apply only "[o]nce these specific threats are verbalized, [because] then the possibility of
harm to third persons becomes foreseeable and the psychiatrist's duty arises"); Eckhardt v.
Kirts, 534 N.E.2d 1339, 1344 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (duty to warn will apply only if there is a
specific threat against a specific person); Leonard v. Latrobe Area Hosp., 625 A.2d 1228,
1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (duty to warn will apply only if there is a threat against a specific
person); Kerrville State Hosp. v. Clark, 900 S.W.2d 425, 436 n.13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995)
(noting that the duty to warn of threats by patient who poses danger of violence to others
can be imposed without a specifically identified victim), rev'd on other grounds, 923 S.W.2d
582 (Tex. 1996); White v. United States, 780 F.2d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (duty to warn will
apply if patient presents "'serious danger of violence' to a 'foreseeable victim').
48. 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980).
49. Id. at 730.
50. Id. at 738.
51. The patient "indicated that he would, if released, take the life of a young child ...
in the neighborhood." Id. at 730.
52. Id. at 738. The court reasoned that such a warning would involve much time and
use of limited resources with unlikely benefits. Id. at 737.
53. See Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (right to sue only if a
therapist fails to warn of specific risks of future harm to readily identifiable victims); Leo-
nard v. Latrobe Area Hosp., 625 A.2d 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (construing Tarasoff 11 as
applying only in cases with a specific threat to a specific person, and finding no duty in this
480 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:471
Although most cases do require that the patient identify specific vic-
tims before the duty to protect will arise,54 other cases have extended the
duty to cover unidentified victims. One such case is Lipari v. Sears, Roe-
buck and Co. ," in which a former psychiatric patient entered a nightclub,
opened fire, wounded the plaintiff, and killed the plaintiff's husband. 6
The court found that the facts that would discharge the duty to protect
vary depending on the circumstances; a warning by itself, might not be
sufficient to protect a therapist from liability.57 In addition, the court ex-
tended the duty to foreseeable victims, or even more vaguely, "a class of
persons of which the [victim was a] member."' 8  One commentator
pointed out that "[t]hus began two traditions of Tarasoff duty, one follow-
ing Thompson and one following Lipari."59 Although most courts follow
one line of Tarasoff based cases or the other,6" not all courts follow the
Tarasoff case or any of its progeny.61
Among courts that recognize the duty, additional confusion centers on
whether the courts should employ an objective or a subjective approach.
Many courts rely on an objective standard, which requires therapists to
predict dangerousness based on the standard of care of the medical com-
munity.62 The objective standard has been widely criticized in commen-
case because there was no specific threat); Peck v. Counseling Serv. of Addison County,
Inc., 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985) (finding a duty to warn readily identifiable victims); Bardoni
v. Kim, 390 N.W.2d 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the duty to protect arises only
if there is an identifiable third person).
54. Mangalmurti, supra note 19, at 384.
55. 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
56. Id. at 187.
57. Id. at 193. See also Jablonski by Pahls v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir.
1983) (finding that a warning, especially one that is "unspecific and inadequate under the
circumstances," could still subject a therapist to liability for harm done by his patient).
58. Jablonski by Pahls, 712 F.2d at-194-95. See also Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d
159, 164-65 (Wis. 1988) (finding that "the duty to warn or to institute commitment proceed-
ings is not limited by a requirement that threats made be directed to an identifiable target,"
and can be imposed even if an unforeseeable plaintiff is involved); Hamman v. County of
Maricopa, 775 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Ariz. 1989) (imposing a duty on therapists to warn any
foreseeable victim who is "within the zone of danger, that is, subject to probable risk of the
patient's violent conduct").
59. Lance C. Egley, Defining the Tarasoff Duty, 19 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 99, 106 (1991)
(reviewing statutes and cases, and pointing out the need for definition of the components
of the Tarasoff duty).
60. Id.
61. See Boyton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
there is no duty to warn because no special relationship exists).
62. See, e.g., Tarasoff H, 551 P.2d at 340 (judging by the standard of the profession);
Lipari, 497 F. Supp. at 193-94 (judging by the standard of care of the therapeutic commu-
nity); Bardoni, 390 N.W.2d at 222 (judging by the standard of the profession).
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tary, and to a lesser extent in cases.63 This criticism has led to the
development of a subjective standard, which requires that an actual
threat be made before the duty will be imposed.' 4
Due to the confusing and conflicting case law handed down over the
years, "[a] consensus is developing on the preference of [using] a legisla-
tive approach" to clarify the laws.65 Commentators argue that the legisla-
ture is better equipped to further develop the law in this area.66
Unfortunately, there are still variations in the legislation between the ju-
risdictions regarding origination of the duty, discharge of the duty, pro-
tections for clinicians, and exclusions.67
Most state statutes require an actual or serious threat;68 thus, therapists
in these jurisdictions no longer have to attempt to predict dangerousness.
This constitutes an effective response by the legislatures to Tarasoff II's
ambiguous "should have known" standard. 69 The actual threat require-
ment creates a preferable bright-line test that recognizes the inherent dif-
ficulties in predicting dangerousness. 70
Victim identification is also addressed in the statutes. The majority of
jurisdictions require that the victims be identified or identifiable. 7 1 Juris-
63. Salter, supra note 10, at 149, 151, 157-59. See also, Egley supra note 59, at 105;
Tarasoff I, 551 P.2d at 354 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
64. See, e.g., Tarasoff II, 551 P.2d at 354 (Mosk, J., dissenting)(questioning whether
professional standards exist and concluding that a duty to warn should arise only if the
therapist actually predicts violence; to do otherwise is to enter the "wonderland of clair-
voyance"); Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983) (stating that "[ulnless
a patient makes specific threats, the possibility that he may inflict injury on another is
vague, speculative, and a matter of conjecture. However, once the patient verbalizes his
intentions ... the possibility of harm to third persons becomes foreseeable" and the duty
arises). See also discussion of statutes infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
65. Felthous, supra note 3, at 590.
66. See id. (stating that although there are variations among the statutes in different
jurisdictions, "public policy can be more clearly established by legislatures than by the
courts"). See also Salter, supra note 10, at 161 (pointing out that the legislature can best
discover the needs of society, patients, and therapists).
67. Appelbaum et al., supra note 46, at 823 (analyzing statutes from California, Colo-
rado, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire,
Ohio, Utah, and Washington). See also Egley, supra note 59 (surveying statutes and cases
involving the duty to protect); Geske, supra note 19 (analyzing cases and statutes imposing
a duty to protect).
68. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.92(a) (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
21-117 (West 1987).
69. Appelbaum et al., supra note 46, at 823. The Tarasoff II standard is subjective,
rather than objective.
70. Id.
.71. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.92(a) (West 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.05.120(2) (West 1992).
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dictions like Kentucky and Indiana, however, have enacted vague statutes
that impose liability for a therapist's failure to warn even though the vic-
tims had not been identified.72
While the duty to protect can be discharged in a variety of ways, warn-
ing the victim, the police, or both is the most popular choice.73 Other
options for discharging the duty include attempted commitment to an in-
stitution, voluntary hospitalization, or a number of other "reasonable"
steps. 74 Although states have developed differing priorities and require-
ments regarding the duty to protect, their statutes at the very least "de-
fine limits to the circumstances of liability which are both more specific
and more narrow than the circumstances of liability under the Tarasoff
line of cases."75 One commentator has noted, however, that the
[d]ifferences in facts of individual cases and differences in state
statutes may contribute to differences in court decisions. It can
be argued that in a pluralistic, democratic society that gives ex-
pression to competing interests, differences of opinion are desir-
able on the highest levels. Unlike a totalitarian society, where
uniform law is determined by the single controlling party
... nonetheless, with regard to the duty to warn or protect, it is
now clear that courts have fundamentally different constructions
of common law. Inconsistencies in legal theory are not desirable
for a legal duty to protect.76
On a positive note, predictability of the law is obtainable through statu-
tory construction, and if the laws become more predictable, then the re-
sult could be a stabilization of therapists' ever-increasing insurance
rates.77 Even so, new ambiguities regarding medical malpractice and pro-
fessional, as opposed to personal, liability of therapists are creating new
doubts and concerns in this area of the law.
72. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400(1)-(2) (Michie 1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 645.270(l)-(2) (Michie 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-2 (Michie Supp. 1996).
73. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.92(b) (West 1996) (therapist must warn both the
victim and the police); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) (thera-
pist must warn both the victim and the police); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.975(1)(e) (West
1989) (therapist must warn either the victim or the police).
74. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.4-3 (Michie Supp. 1996) (duty discharged if
therapist seeks civil commitment of the patient or takes other reasonable steps necessary
to prevent violence); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-12.4-3 (Michie 1996) (duty discharged if
therapist seeks civil commitment of the patient or takes other reasonable steps necessary
to prevent violence).
75. Geske, supra note 19, at 415.
76. Felthous, supra note 3, at 588-89.
77. Geske, supra note 19, at 415.
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III. ANALYZING THE MALPRACTICE CASES
A new uncertainty regarding therapist liability has arisen in the context
of the Tarasoff II duty to protect. Courts are divided over whether a
breach of the duty to protect constitutes malpractice; some courts have
found a single duty to protect with "inextricable" subparts," while other
courts have found two independent duties within the overall duty to pro-
tect.79 In addition, statutory construction has led to a split in authorities
because a breach of the duty constitutes malpractice in some jurisdic-
tions,"o and ordinary negligence in others.8 '
The Tarasoff II court held that "[w]hen a therapist determines, or pur-
suant to the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient
presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation
to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such dan-
ger."' 82 In Tarasoff II, one of the factors required in order to find the duty
was "the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk in-
volved.",83 These portions of Tarasoff 11 are essential to any examination
of the cases dealing with the malpractice issue. Although Tarasoff II is
binding only in California, the court's reasoning should lead to applica-
tion of this decision in the malpractice context.
A. Duty to Protect: Inextricable Subparts and Professional
Negligence for Breach of the Duty
In Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County,84 the California
Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether failure to warn consti-
tutes "professional negligence" or ordinary negligence. 5 In this case, two
psychologists were sued by a mother and son for malpractice after their
patient shot and seriously injured the mother in the presence of her mi-
nor son.86 The patient had expressed his intentions to harm the plaintiff
78. See Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange Cty., 669 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1983).
79. See Hutchinson v. Patel, 637 So. 2d 415 (La. 1994).
80. See, e.g., Hedlund, 669 P.2d at 45-46; Wilschinsky v. Medina, 775 P.2d 713, 719-20
(N.M. 1989).
81. See, e.g., Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 428; Midtown Community Mental Health Ctr.
v. Gahl, 540 N.E.2d 1259, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1386 (1989).
82. Tarasoff H, 551 P.2d at 340.
83. Id. at 342. This is a very important consideration when facing the possibility of
personal, rather than professional, liability. See infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
84. 669 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1983).
85. Id. at 42. The court was called upon to see if the statute of limitations had run out
on plaintiff's cause of action, which led to this issue. Id.
86. Id. at 43.
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mother to the psychologists, yet the doctors did not warn anyone of the
danger.87
The Hedlund court began its analysis by discussing the applicable Cali-
fornia statute that defined professional negligence as "a negligent act or
omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional
services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury
or wrongful death."88 Based on the statute, the court found that the duty
to protect consists of a duty to diagnose dangerousness and a duty to
warn the threatened third party.89
The court observed that "[t]he warning aspect of this duty.., is inextri-
cably interwoven with the diagnostic function."9 The court unequivo-
cally ruled that "[t]he diagnosis and the appropriate steps necessary to
protect the victim are not separate or severable, but together constitute
the-duty giving rise to the cause of action" and that both involve profes-
sional judgment.9' The court concluded that the plaintiff had a cause of
action for professional negligence, and that this finding was within the
purpose of California's Medical Malpractice Act.92 The court pointed out
that the legislature's stated purpose was
"to provide an adequate and reasonable remedy" for the "major
health care crisis . . . attributable to skyrocketing malpractice
premium[s] ... resulting in a potential breakdown of the health
delivery system, severe hardships for the medically indigent, a
denial of access for the economically marginal, and depletion of
physicians such as to substantially worsen the quality of health
care available. 93
Obviously, as the court mentioned, if the therapist's professional negli-
gence harms third parties, then the Medical Malpractice Act's goal of re-
ducing monetary judgments in these types of actions would be frustrated
if the court were to decide that the Act does not apply.94 The court fur-
ther reasoned that "[i]t would be anomalous ... if a third party's cause of
87. Id.
88. Id. at 42 n.2 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC' CODE § 340.5(2) (West 1992)).
89. Id. at 45.
90. Id. One commentator aptly summarized the court's reasoning, stating "that the
implementation of adequate means to protect an intended victim is as much a component
of a psychotherapist's duty as is the diagnosis of patient violence; both facets involved the
rendering of professional services." Small, supra note 44, at 288.
91. Hedlund, 669 P.2d at 45.
92. Id. at 45-46.
93. Id. at 45 (citing CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.5(2)).
94. Id. at 45-46.
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action . *. were treated differently than an action by the patient."95
In Wilschinsky v. Medina,96 the New Mexico Supreme Court reached
similar conclusions regarding professional negligence and the duty to pro-
tect. The court found that the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act
("NMMMA") 97 was.applicable when a third party sued a doctor for pro-
fessional negligence.98
The court cited the legislature's definition of malpractice which "'in-
cludes any cause of action ... against a health care provider for medical
treatment, lack of medical treatment or other claimed departure from ac-
cepted standards of health care which proximately results in injury to the
patient."' 99 The NMMMA, like the California Medical Malpractice Act,
was designed to cope with the health care crisis and "to promote health
care ... by providing a framework for tort liability with which the insur-
ance industry could operate."'" The court indicated that the legislature
clearly intended to have malpractice insurance "available to health care
providers.""'' In addition, the court found that an "unreasonable classifi-
cation would result" if a third party could receive full monetary recovery
from the doctor's negligence while actual patients of the doctor would be
limited in their recovery because of the caps on judgments that the
NMMMA imposes.'0 2 Thus, although the NMMMA specified injury to
the patient in its definition, the court found that in the interest of justice
and to meet the legislative intent, third party claims must also be covered
by the NMMMA. 1°3
Not all courts"° have been able to reach the rational conclusions found
in the above two cases. Statutory construction and interpretation have
prevented courts from finding a malpractice cause of action for breaches
95. Id. at 46.
96. 775 P.2d 713 (N.M. 1989).
97. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5 (Michie 1996).
98. Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 720. The doctor medicated a patient and allowed her to
leave his office. She then drove her car and caused an accident, injuring the plaintiff. Id. at
714. The court found that the doctor had a duty to the driving public and that he breached
that duty. Id. at 717.
99. Id. at 718 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-3(c)).
100. Id. at 718 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-2).
101. Id. at 719 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-3(c)).
102. Id. Some states impose caps on medical malpractice liability. See, e.g., N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie 1996) (limiting plaintiff recovery to $600,000 and limiting a health
care provider's personal liability to $200,000).
103. 775 P.2d at 719-20.
104. Hutchinson v. Patel, 637 So. 2d 415 (La. 1994); Midtown Community Mental
Health Ctr. v. Gahl, 540 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1386
(1989).
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of the duty to protect. °5
B. Duty to Protect: Two Independent Duties and Ordinary
Negligence for Breach of the Duty
In Hutchinson v. Patel,106 the Louisiana Supreme Court also con-
fronted the issue of whether a psychiatrist's failure to warn or take rea-
sonable precautions to protect third parties constitutes malpractice. 0 7 In
that case, a patient voluntarily entered a psychiatric hospital and was
placed under the care of the defendant psychiatrist, Dr. Patel.10 8 The pa-
tient was released a short time later and subsequently shot the plaintiff,
who is now permanently disabled.'" 9 Rejecting the well-reasoned deci-
sions in Wilschinsky and Hedlund,'10 the court held that the plaintiff's
claim was not covered by the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act
("LMMA,,).111
The LMMA has the same purpose as the California and New Mexico
acts; it is designed "to reduce or stabilize medical malpractice insurance
rates and to assure the availability of affordable medical services to the
public."'1 2 The court observed that the LMMA protects health care
providers by limiting the amount a plaintiff can recover through statutory
105. Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 428; Gahl, 540 N.E.2d at 1262.
106. 637 So. 2d 415 (La. 1994).
107. Id. at 415. Louisiana recognizes the Tarasoff doctrine. It is codified at LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995):
A. When a patient has communicated a threat of physical violence, which is
deemed to be significant in the clinical judgment of the treating [therapist] ...
against a clearly identified victim or victims, coupled with the apparent intent...
to carry out such threat, the [therapist] ... treating such patient and exercising
reasonable professional judgment, shall not be liable for a breach of confidential-
ity for warning of such threat or taking precautions to provide protection from
the patient's violent behavior.
B. A [therapist]'s... duty to warn or to take reasonable precautions... shall be
discharged ... if he makes a reasonable effort to communicate the threat to the
potential victim or victims and to notify law enforcement authorities in the vicin-
ity of the patient's or potential victim's residence.
108. Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 418.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 423-25. The Louisiana court was limited in its ruling by the statutory con-
struction, but it also interpreted the duty differently. Id. at 420-24.
111. Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 418; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1996). Dr. Patel sought the dismissal of Hutchinson's cause of action because the
Medical Malpractice Act requires that a medical review panel assess the case before a civil
action is filed. Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 418.
112. Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 419.
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caps on judgments, and by limiting the volume of formal litigation.1 13
The Louisiana legislature defines malpractice as "any unintentional
tort or any breach of contract based on health care or professional serv-
ices rendered, or which should have been rendered, by a health care pro-
vider, to a patient. "114 Dr. Patel1 15 argued to the court that excluding
these types of claims from coverage under the LMMA would contravene
the "Act's purpose of guaranteeing insurance coverage for health care
providers."" 6 He went on to explain that if the claim does not constitute
malpractice, then malpractice insurance would not be available to com-
pensate the doctor for any judgments that might be rendered against
him. 7 Similarly, the comprehensive general liability ("CGL") cover-
age' 18 probably would not cover a Tarasoff claim because CGL regularly
"exclude[s] coverage of claims arising from the rendering or failure to
render professional services." ' Consequently, the therapist would be
left without any insurance coverage. E In spite of all of the defendant's
valid arguments regarding the realities of insurance coverage and the
court's observations about the purposes of the LMMA, the court dis-
missed these arguments as "speculative.' 21
The court rejected Dr. Patel's argument, which was based on Hedlund,
that the duty to warn is inextricably interwoven with the diagnostic func-
tion of finding the patient to be dangerous.' 22 Instead, the court decided
that the duty to warn requires only reasonable care; therefore, it is in-
dependent from the therapist's duty to diagnose dangerousness, which
requires a professional standard of care and is owed to the patient
113. Id.
114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41.A(8) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996). Note the simi-
larity between Louisiana's definitions and New Mexico's definitions, supra note 99 and
supporting text.
115. Defendant Patel is joined by the Louisiana Psychiatric Association and the Louisi-
ana State Medical Society as amici curiae. Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 422.
116. Id. at 422.
117. Id. at 423.
118. CGL is a form of insurance that covers the "non-professional risks associated with
a therapist's practice." Id.
119. Id. (Although the court decides that it is not professional negligence, the insurance
company may still classify it as a professional service because it is rendered by the therapist
as part of his practice.).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 424. In a concurring opinion, Justice Hall asserts that insurance matters
should be litigated later, when the policy provisions can be reviewed. Id. at 429 (Hall, J.,
concurring). Such a proposal would not, however, reduce the volume of litigation or limit
litigation related costs.
122. Id. at 424.
19971
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alone. 123 The court found: (1) there was not a contract between a third
party and the doctor, which is required under traditional malpractice
claims, and (2) there were no professional services rendered to the
nonpatient tort victim. Thus, the court concluded that the LMMA could
not apply to a third party claim.'24
The Hutchinson court also discussed the need to control health care
costs, stating that "[s]urely the legislature did not intend to control the
rising costs of medical services by limiting health care providers' liability
for acts unrelated to the provision of medical services .... [I]nterpreting
'malpractice' to include claims arising from injuries to ... a non-patient
would not promote the purpose of the Act.' 125 Ironically, the court char-
acterized Dr. Patel's breach of the duty to warn as an unintentional tort,
which although not actionable as malpractice, "may proceed in district
court as an ordinary negligence action."'1 6 Thus, the plaintiff could sue
for more money because the cause of action was ordinary negligence and
not professional negligence.
The Louisiana court failed to recognize that subjecting a therapist to
personal liability for a duty required, of therapists only in the exercise of
their practice will not make health care more affordable. The construc-
tion of the statute, limiting malpractice to patient services only and ex-
cluding all third party claims, is contrary to the purpose behind the
legislation. 127
.123. Id. Butsee discussion regarding the standard of care infra notes 149-58 and accom-
panying text. In addition, the Tarasoff court based the duty to protect on the fact that
there is a special relationship between a therapist and patient. Tarasoff 1I, 551 P.2d at 343.
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, section 314(a) states that without a special rela-
tionship, there is no duty. If the duty to warn is not a part of professional judgment, then it
is even more questionable whether a duty exists at all. Courts and commentators have
criticized the existence of a duty between therapists and outpatients over whom they.do
not have control. See, e.g., Hasenei, 541 F. Supp. at 1009 (holding that a psychiatrist had no
right to control an outpatient's behavior, and thus, had no duty); Boyton, 590 So. 2d at 449
(holding that a psychiatrist had no right to control an outpatient's behavior, and thus, had
no duty); Stone, supra note 9, at 366 (stating that "the therapist seeing an outpatient in a
clinic or office has no control over the patient").
124. Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 428. But see Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 719-20, which held
that the medical malpractice act covered third parties even though the wording of the stat-
ute appeared to restrict claims to the patients themselves. See discussion supra note 111
and accompanying text.
125. Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 422 (emphasis added). It is difficult to fathom how a
duty to warn is "unrelated to medical services." See discussion of the type of medical
services offered by therapists infra notes 145-53; 168-71 and accompanying text.
126. Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 420.
127. This is precisely why the New Mexico Supreme Court went beyond the wording of
its statute. See discussion of Wilschinsky supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
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Unfortunately, Louisiana is not the only state moving in this direction.
The Indiana Court of Appeals, in Midtown Community Mental Health
Center v. Gahl,'128 held that the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act
("IMMA") was not applicable to a negligence cause of action raised by
someone other than a health care provider's patient. 29 The court found,
understandably, that the IMMA does not apply to every case naming a
health care provider as a defendant.1 30 The court decided, however, that
the IMMA does not apply to failure to warn a nonpatient of danger be-
cause it is not "so intertwined [with rendering services] that it falls within
[its] purview.' 13 1 The Indiana court, like the Louisiana court, acknowl-
edged that the plaintiff had a valid ordinary negligence claim against the
defendant hospital.132
Fortunately, the dissent recognized the logic of the Hedlund decision
and argued that a failure to protect a potential victim after diagnosing a
patient as dangerous can be professional negligence. 133 The dissent con-
tended that the IMMA should cover both the treatment of the patient
and the duty to warn victims of danger.13 1 In addition, the dissent recog-
nized the inherent unfairness in .allowing a nonpatient to recover more
than a patient for the.therapist's failure to provide proper care. 135 Thus,
the dissent would have dismissed the case because the duty to warn is
128. 540 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1386 (1989). In this
case, a former patient of the defendant hospital killed probation officer Gahl. Gahl's es-
tate sued the hospital on the grounds that "defendants were negligent in their care of [the
patient] and that the defendants' failure to warn Gahl ... caused [his] death." Id. at 1260.
The defendant in this case, as in Hutchinson, argued that the suit should be dismissed until
reviewed by a medical review panel. Id.
129. Gahl, 540 N.E.2d at 1261-62. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-1(h) (West 1989)(re-
pealed 1993)(defining malpractice as "any tort ... based on health care or professional
services rendered, or which should have been re-ndered, by a health care provider to a
patient"). It should be noted that the new provision, IND. CODE ANN. § 27-12-2-18 (West
1994 & Supp. 1995), defines malpractice in almost identical terms.
130. The court gives as an example a case where the plaintiff sues because of the de-
fendant's negligence in the maintenance of its facility. 540 N.E.2d at 1260. The example
given is a far cry from the negligence in failing to warn.
131. Id. at 1262.
132. The court in Gahl, like the Hutchinson court, inferred that its holding would meet
the act's purpose of "preserv[ing] health care services and thereby protect[ing] the public
health and well being of the community." Id. at 1260.
133. Id. at 1263 (Hoffman, J., dissenting) (citing Hedlund, 669 P.2d at 45-46).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1262-63. Interestingly, the dissent is citing to the Louisiana case of Thomas
v. LeJeune, Inc., 501 So. 2d 1075 (La. Ct. App. 1987) which was overruled by Hutchinson.
LeJeune had held that any patient or nonpatient lawsuits claiming medical malpractice had
to first go through the medical review panel process. Id. at 1077.
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"derived from the medical diagnosis and care given to a patient," invok-
ing the medical review panel requirement of the IMMA.
136
C. Ordinary Negligence Liability v. Malpractice Liability
Each of the preceding court decisions and statutes address the same
goals: reducing health care costs, providing malpractice insurance to
health care providers, and increasing health service availability. Unfortu-
nately, the state of the law has created a "catch-22"' '37 situation with re-
gard to achieving those goals. A duty to protect that consists of
inextricably interwoven subparts falling under the medical malpractice
acts may cause malpractice insurance rates to increase, and subsequently
raise health care costs. On the other hand, finding a therapist personally
liable by creating two independent duties could have a devastating impact
on health care costs as well. Therapists will either raise their fees in an
effort to compensate for substantial uninsurable risks, or they will aban-
don this field of practice, which will cause increased health care costs due
to scarcity of providers. 138 Two public interests are served by decreasing
monetary judgments against therapists through caps set by malpractice
statutes: (1) availability of a functional health care system with adequate
numbers of doctors for all citizens, and (2) reasonable recoveries for
those harmed by malpractice. 39
The availability of insurance to balance the risk of liability is an impor-
tant goal for all jurisdictions.14 ° Medical malpractice acts are designed to
ensure that health care providers have insurance. 4' As the defendants in
Hutchinson pointed out, if the courts find that the duty to warn is not
malpractice, then a gap in insurance coverage will result, leaving ther-
apists personally liable for their failure to warn and defeating the purpose
of the acts. 142 The caps on recovery under the various medical malprac-
136. 540 N.E.2d at 1263.
137. Catch-22 is defined as "a situation presenting two equally undesirable alterna-
tives." WEBSTER'S NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 215 (1988).
138. The economic concept of supply and demand states that if supply decreases while
demand remains constant or increases, price for the commodity (e.g., health care) will in-
crease. JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP, MICROECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC CHOICE 63 (5th ed. 1992).
139. Hedlund, 669 P.2d at 44-45.
140. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) ("Tarasoff Ir");
Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange Cty., 669 P.2d 41, 45 (Cal. 1983); Wilschinsky v.
Medina, 775 P.2d 713, 718 (N.M. 1989); Hutchinson v. Patel, 637 So. 2d 415, 419 (La. 1994).
141. See, e.g., Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 719 (discussing N.M. STAT. ANN. sec. 41-5-2).
142. See discussion of the defendant's arguments supra notes 122-25 and accompanying
text.
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tice acts will help keep health-care costs under control by limiting mone-
tary judgments against therapists.' 43
Following the Hedlund court's logic, it is anomalous that in a suit in
Louisiana or Indiana, based on the same negligent act, a third party
would recover more than a patient would be eligible to receive.144 The
act of warning a third party is a part of the professional service a therapist
provides. 145 The Tarasoff II court admitted that its opinion was vague as
to whether a professional standard applied when it indicated that a thera-
pist should "take whatever... steps are reasonably necessary under the
circumstances" to protect potential victims. 1 46 This duty, however, is im-
posed only on the therapist and is based on the special relationship be-
tween a therapist and patient.' 47  Certainly then, selecting the
appropriate means under the circumstances to protect third parties from
violence "will hinge on a professional determination of the most effective
method. . . . What appears reasonable to a practicing therapist as a
method of deterring patient violence may not appear reasonable to the
man of ordinary prudence. ,148
The duty to protect actually consists of two uses of the standard of
reasonable care. 49 In determining dangerousness, "the therapist must
use reasonable care in applying" the standards of the professional com-
munity. 5 In addition, reasonable care must be employed by the thera-
pist "in discharging the duty to warn or protect the potential victim."''
Thus, although the duty to protect consists of the two uses of the duty of
reasonable care, the underlying standard is that of the professional com-
munity.152 Tarasoff type claims involve professional judgment and should
143. Hedlund, 669 P.2d at 45-46.
144. See id. at 46. See also Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 719 (finding that an "unreasonable
classification" would result).
145. See Small, supra note 44, at 288 (discussing Hedlund). But see Hutchinson, 637 So.
2d at 422.
146. Tarasoff I, 551 P.2d at 340. See also Stephen Craig Bednar, The Psychotherapist's
Calamity: Emerging Trends in the Tarasoff Doctrine, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 261, 264 n.14
(discussing discharge of the duty to protect).
147. See discussion of special relationships supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
148. Bednar, supra note 146, at 264 n.14.
149. Geske, supra note 19, at 394.
150. Id. See also Mangalmurti, supra note 19, at 384 ("the crucial part of the Tarasoff
doctrine is the standard that says the therapist will be held to the standards of the requisite
medical community").
151. Geske, supra note 19, at 394.
152. Id.
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be considered malpractice. 15
3
If the failure of a therapist to meet the duty to warn or prevent harm to
third parties is ordinary negligence and not malpractice, 154 then the im-
pact on therapists could be significant. One study has found that doctors
who are sued for malpractice are likely to suffer emotional distress, to
discontinue treatment of dangerous patients, to discourage their children
from entering the medical field, and even to retire early. 155 These reac-
tions could become more pronounced when a therapist is faced with per-
sonal liability instead of insured malpractice liability. Now the law in
some jurisdictions not only threatens the professional status and self-es-
teem of therapists, but it also exposes their personal savings and assets to
potentially devastating tort liability.
In response to the Louisiana court's classification of the duty as ordi-
nary negligence and imposing personal liability, one commentator has
suggested ways to get around liability altogether in that state.'56 She sug-
gests that (1) a therapist will not be liable for a failure to predict, even if
the "therapist acts unreasonably in exercising professional judgment" be-.
cause it is not a duty owed to third parties, and (2) "a therapist will not be
liable even after an actual threat is made because the therapist can always
claim that no prediction of violence was ever made.' 15 7 If these sugges-
tions are true reflections of reality, then the results are certainly uncon-
scionable: they not only restrict liability, but also restrict any notion of
professional ethics as well.' 58
Similar predictions of therapist reactions were made following the
Tarasoff II decision, but fortunately the impact was not as great as was
expected.' 59 Unfortunately, the therapist is no longer able to rely on in-
153. See Hedlund, 669 P.2d at 45; Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 719; Midtown, 540 N.E.2d at
1262-63 (Hoffman, J., dissenting). See also Small, supra note 44, at 288.
154. See Hutchinson, 637 So. 2d at 420; Midtown, 540 N.E.2d at 1260.
155. Sara C. Charles et al., Sued and Nonsued Physicians' Self Reported Reactions to
Malpractice Litigation, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 437 (1985). At least one commentator has
found that Tarasoff has not impacted on the field of psychotherapy as greatly as some
commentators had predicted. Mangalmurti, supra note 19, at 404-05 (stating that ther-
apists "pay little heed to Tarasoff, and the practice of psychotherapy thrives"). At that
time, however, malpractice insurance at least softened the blow, and therapists' personal
assets were not threatened.
156. Liuzza, supra note 5, at 1026.
157. Id. The commentator claims that a therapist will only be liable if he commits an
overt act in attempting to warn a third party, showing that he predicted the patient was
dangerous and that the warning was insufficient and unreasonable. Id.
158. These examples clearly exhibit the need for malpractice liability in this area of the
law.
159. See, e.g., Mangalmurti, supra note 19, at 404-05 ("in the long run, Tarasoff is less a
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surance coverage in the event of breach, as he had been able to do when
those predictions were made. Under the old liability standard, a thera-
pist's liability concerns could become so great that he would enter into
the therapeutic relationship with a "wary eye toward protecting his own
interests.- 160 The therapist's concern for the patient would be diluted,
and his "devotion to both the fiduciary duty and the therapeutic project"
would be undermined. 6 1 These predictions may be more accurate now
than they were in the past. Some jurisdictions are not willing to allow
therapists such "easy outs" as were mentioned above,' 62 and all jurisdic-
tions would be wise to follow their lead.
IV. THE NEED FOR CHANGE AND CONSISTENCY
Undeniably, there continues to be confusion regarding the extent of a
therapist's duty to a third party. 163 Now there is added confusion as to
the type of liability that may be imposed on therapists who fail to fulfill
their duty to third parties. A commentator once stated, "it appears clear
that no court decision in the last generation has succeeded in so raising
the anxieties of mental health professionals [as that of Tarasoff i] ;,164
that observation was made before Hutchinson v. Patel became the law in
Louisiana.
It is evident that consistency in the law is necessary 65 to provide ther-
apists with notice regarding their potential liability and to help reduce
health care costs nationwide. The cases and statutes that find dependent
duties within the duty to protect and that allow third party malpractice
claims are the best alternatives as models for change.' 66 Those decisions
threat than a misplaced fear in one collective mind"); D. J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth
and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 443 (arguing
that based on their survey, Tarasoff has not discouraged therapists from treating dangerous
patients). Hutchinson could prove to be a more substantive threat.
160. Robert F. Schopp & David B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due Care:
Psychotherapists and Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 163,
184 (1989).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Bardoni, 390 N.W.2d at 222 (showing that courts will scrutinize whether a
therapist should have found that the patient was dangerous); Mavroudis v. Superior Ct.,
102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 604-05 (1980) (showing that a therapist's duty to protect will be
scrutinized through records, testimony, and even expert affidavits or testimony).
163. See, e.g., Melella et al., supra note 47, at 110-11 (arguing in addition to this that if
courts broaden liability therapists will no longer treat risky patients).
164. Appelbaum et al., supra note 46, at 821.
165. Felthous, supra note 76, at 588-89 and accompanying text.
166. See Hedlund, 669 P.2d at 45; Wilschinsky, 775 P.2d at 719; Midtown, 540 N.E.2d at
1262-63 (Hoffman, J., dissenting); CAL. PROC. CODE § 340.5(2) (West 1996).
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are more likely to result in insurance coverage for health care providers
and health care service for all.' 67 Imposing personal liability on ther-
apists will not solve the problems articulated by the courts as legislative
goals.
People view doctors and therapists as professionals committed to aid-
ing others; 168 thus, a professional therapist's failure to protect a third
party should constitute malpractice. 169 In addition, a patient who actively
seeks professional help recognizes that he "does not [actually] want to
hurt others and feels that such desires are misguided."' 7 ° The patient
tells the therapist his thoughts because he "wants help and ... may feel
that by telling the therapist of his desires, the therapist will do what she
can to stop him.''7 Thus, failure to warn should constitute malpractice
because the therapist has not done all that she can to help the patient
eliminate his dangerous propensities.
A therapist can help the patient break the chain of violent desires
through a warning to a third party that would not only protect the third
party, but would also remove the temptation of the third party from the
patient's sights. If this is truly why the patient came to the therapist, then
she has not fulfilled her professional duties to the patient and should be
liable for malpractice to both the patient and the third party.
Current statutes need to be amended, making it clear that the duty to
protect consists of dependent subparts and that the breach of either one
of the subparts will subject therapists to professional liability to both pa-
tients and third parties. Currently, the duty to protect statutes grant ther-
apists immunity from liability for disclosure and are an exception to the
traditional rule that requires doctor-patient confidentiality.17 1 In light of
the developments in Louisiana and Indiana, the statutes should add a sec-
tion that states unequivocally that the failure to discharge the duty to
protect a third party, either by failing to predict or failing to warn, consti-
167. See discussion supra notes 140-67 and accompanying text.
168. Mangalmurti, supra note 19, at 402.
169. See, e.g., Hedlund, 669 P.2d at 45-46.
170. Mangalmurti, supra note 19, at 400.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2.C (West 1991 & Supp. 1995) ("No liabil-
ity or cause of action shall arise against psychologist or psychiatrist based on . . . breach of
confidentiality for any confidence disclosed to a third party in an effort to discharge the
duty."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14a-2(2) (1992) ("No cause of action arises against a thera-
pist for.., disclosure of confidential information, based on a therapist's communication of
information to a third party in an effort to discharge his duty.").
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tutes professional negligence.' 73 In addition, the medical malpractice acts
should reflect that professional negligence consists of any "negligent act,
or omission to act, by a health care provider in the rendering of profes-
sional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal
injury or wrongful death."'1 74 Thus, the malpractice cause of action would
no longer be limited only to injuries to a patient, and therapists would not
face personal liability.
V. CONCLUSION
For almost twenty years, the courts and legislatures in jurisdictions
around the United States have imposed a duty on therapists to protect
third parties from dangerous patients. Unfortunately, these laws change
often and do not always change for the better. Consistency definitely is
needed in this area of the law. There are no perfect solutions to the
problems surrounding the duty to protect; however, Louisiana's decision
to impose personal liability on therapists certainly is not the answer.
Statutes and court decisions need to reflect reality: therapists are ren-
dering a professional service when they predict their patient's dangerous-
ness and when they subsequently warn third parties of danger. They
should not be personally liable because this is not a personal duty; it is a
professional duty based on the special relationship that exists between a
therapist and his patient. The statutes need to state that a breach of the
duty to protect constitutes malpractice and is actionable by third parties.
A third party's claim should also fall under the medical malpractice acts
because it is unfair for a third party to recover more than a patient for the
same negligent act.
Health care affordability is a major issue in the 1990s for the govern-
ment, courts, health care providers, and citizens. The laws need to pro-
tect the interests of the therapists, as well as third parties and patients.
The costs of imposing personal liability on therapists could include scar-
city of health care providers willing to treat dangerous patients, a resul-
tant reduction in public safety, increased costs as therapists exit the
market, and increased fees charged by those therapists brave enough to
gamble their personal assets on an uninsurable risk. The cost of establish-
ing professional liability is a potential increase in malpractice insurance
173. This amendment is particularly important because of the fact that statutes will
sometimes list a number of options for discharging the duty. A therapist must then use
professional judgment to determine which option is best in a particular situation. Bednar,
supra note 146, at 264 n.14.
174. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5(2) (West 1996).
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rates, but existing caps on malpractice judgments would help keep that
cost under control.
Although classifying the duty to protect as one duty, made up of "inex-
tricable" subparts, subject only to malpractice liability, does not guaran-
tee a solution to the health care problem, it is a more viable option than
finding two duties and imposing personal rather than professional liability
on therapists.
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